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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE TRADE UNION*
By T. RICHARD WITMER f
WE usually think of the civil liberties problem, I suppose, as one of
limiting the area within which the state may bring its power to bear
against the individual. We do not ordinarily think of it as a matter of
protecting one private person from the power of another. But it can
have this aspect, too. The importance of this side of it was as well put
as it ever has been by Governor Shunk of Pennsylvania ninety-five years
ago. Asked by the General Assembly of the state to approve a bill to
incorporate the North Branch Railroad and Coal Company, he refused.
Among the reasons he gave for vetoing it was one explained thus:
"The company contemplated by this bill, with its six thousand
five hundred acres of land, and a half million of capital, will employ
many men, all of them in a degree dependent upon the controlling
power of the corporation. Our own history furnishes too many
lamentable proofs of the fact, that power of this kind may be used,
not only to exact the labor for which compensation is made, but also
to circumscribe that range of thought and independence of action
upon political subjects, which constitute the pride and dignity of
an American freeman."'
If in a day before there was yet a general corporation statute on the books
the Governor could speak of the many "lamentable proofs" which history
had already furnished, with what greater certainty could the same ob-
jection be made today? For it must be clear that in a system based, as is
ours, on employment at will the power to discharge carries with it a
tremendous power to interfere not only with those liberties of the em-
ployee which we call civil but even with those duties which from time
to time the state exacts of him.
What remedy, for instance, does our legal system afford an employee
who is discharged because he chooses to speak his mind freely on a sub-
ject obnoxious to his employer? What remedy is available if he is dis-
criminated agaiist because he writes a letter to the press criticizing a city
administration supported by his employer? In how many of our states
has he any relief if he votes the wrong way?2 "hat redress can he get
* This paper, with a few inconsequential variations, was read at a meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, December 27, 1940, devoted to a symposium on
civil liberties. Here, as there, it is presented more as a program for future investigation
thin as a report on a completed project. Though the questions that it has to ask are def-
inite enough, the answers suggested are, even in the author's own mind, highly tentative.
"]'Assistant Professor of Law, Yale-Law School.
1. Message of April 12, 1845, 7 PA. ARcmvEs (4th ser. 1902) 35, 37.
2. Compare Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S. XV. (2d) 612 (Mo. App. 1934) (no action for
damages lies for violation of a statute making it criminal to discharge an employee "for
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if he is discharged for testifying under subpoena contrary to what his
employer supposes to be his interests? If my reading of the absence of
cases is correct - and on this subject does not absence of law speak more
loudly than its presence?- there is none. As primitive, as elementary
in our thinking as the privilege of a merchant to choose his customers,
to refuse to serve for any reason or for no reason at all, is the privilege
of the employer to hire and to fire for any reason or for no reason at all.
We have been content, in other words, to build up sanctions against the
deprivation of civil liberties by the public power of the state; we have
given little thought - however commonplace be our acceptance of the
notion that political democracy and unrestrained economic power are not
compatible bedfellows - to the importance of providing sanctions against
the use of the private power of the employer to the same end.
This privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is, of course, being sub-
jected to restraints today. Contract and statute alike are cutting in on it.
The familiar clauses of the collective bargain that the employer will not
discharge without "cause" ' and that employees will be accorded a hear-
ing before being fired 4 are, we may be quite sure, a considerable guar-
antee against the sort of practices that have been mentioned. So, too,
under recent statutes. Probably of greater long-run significance than the
reason of the political opinions or belief of such employee," etc.). See RowLAND, THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE WORKER'S JOB (1937) 94-95 for a collection of such statutes.
See also CommONs & ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLAT1IN (rev. ed. 1927) 97
("Some effort has been made to protect the employee as a voter from coercion by the
employer. More than three-fourths of the states have laws which in general provide that
any employer who attempts by coercion, intimidation, or threats to discharge or to lessen
the remuneration of an employee to influence his vote in any election, etc., is guilty of
a misdemeanor . . .").
3. See Moore v. Illinois Central R. R., 112 F. (2d) 959, 966 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940),
cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 392 (U. S. 1940) ("The filing by an employee . . . of a
suit to establish his seniority status [under a collective agreement] is not . . . a just
cause to discharge him ;" cf. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 92 S. W.
(2d) 749 (1936)); Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692
(1928) (supporting arbitrator's finding that plaintiff was wrongfully discharged). Com-
pare Amolette v. Dold Packing Co., 173 Misc. 477, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 929 (Sup. Ct.
1940) ("Plaintiff's discharge was not for cause in the sense used in the contract but
solely by virtue of the right vested in the employer to discontinue his business if and when
he saw fit.").
4. For examples of such agreements, see LIEBERMAN, THE COLL-c'riv LABOR AGREE-
MENT (1939) 86 et seq., which, unfortunately, has none from the railroad industry where
they appear to be most uniformly in force. A majority of our courts are willing to en-
force such agreements in a suit for damages. See, e.g., Gary v. Central of Ga. Ry., 37
Ga. App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928); McGlohn v. Gulf & Ship Island R. R., 179 Miss.
396, 174 So. 250 (1937) ; Lyons v. St. Joseph Belt Ry., 84 S. W. (2d) 933 (Mo. App.
1935); Youmans v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 175 S. C. 99, 178 S. E. 671 (1933); Man-
sell v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 137 S. W. (2d) 997 (Tex. Comm. App. 1940). Conlra: Davis
v. Davis, 197 Ind. 386, 151 N. E. 134 (1926); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky.
578, 92 S. W. (2d) 749 (1.936).
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extension of federal power under the National Labor Relations Act is
the reinstatement and back-pay technique that it carries with it. Though
this is not quite the first time in our history that employers have been
told by the legislators that there are some causes for which they may
not discharge employees,0 it is the first in which an effective remedy has
been given directly to the aggrieved individual. Already its vigorous
enforcement, Warren Madden has told us, has brought about a consid-
erable cessation of anti-civil liberty activity:'
"As employers have come to concede the rights of their employees
under this law, other troublesome problems concerning civil liberties
have been eliminated or simplified in many communities. In the
past, many of the asserted violations of civil liberties have occurred
in industrial towns. In those towns, the question of freedom of
assembly, speech, or publication, nearly always arose in connection
with the attempted organization or activity of a labor union. When
the principal employers in such communities have begun to obey the
National Labor Relations Act and to keep their hands out of the
union question, the other civil liberties problems largely disappear.
The police do not interfere with assembly, speech or publication,
because no one is asking them to interfere. Magistrates do not jail
union organizers under 'disorderly conduct' or 'suspicious person'
statutes or ordinances, because there is no pressure upon them to do
so. And if the town is 'open' for labor union meetings, there is little
likelihood of any interference with speech, press, or assembly for
other purposes. '
We have not yet seen the end of this development. Already Congress
has followed, with surprisingly little debate, the lead of the National
Labor Relations Act by requiring, in the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940,7 that employers reinstate men called into military service
after their term is over.' The time may yet come when our legislatures
5. See, e.g., Poye v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. App. 182, 230 S. W. 161 (1920) (criminal
prosecution for discharging employee who testified before Industrial Welfare Commis-
sion) and material cited supra note 2.
6. OLD LIERTIES AND NEv (1939) 4 (NLRB mimeographed release No. 2169).
7. Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1940) § 8(b).
8. Compare, however, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16, 52 STAT. 1069 (1938),
29 U. S. C. § 216 (Supp. 1939), which provides only for criminal proceedings against an
employer who "discharge[s] or in any other manner discriminate[s] against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." Under
NLRA § 8, 45 STAT. 452 (1937), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (Supp. 1938), however, it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to "discharge or otherwise discriminate against an em-
ployee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this chapter." For practice
under the Walsh-Healey Act (48 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §§35 et scq. (1938
Supp.)) which makes no provision for protecting a complaining employee either directly
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will consider more broadly the task of formulating the circumstances
under which employers will not be allowed to discriminate against their
employees.
Meanwhile the beginnings of a new system are visible. Job control
is passing from employer to union. For the most part, in contests between
union and member, the courts are supporting the forrer's claim of au-
thority to make general rules determinative of who shall and who shall
not be employed.9 'The further this development progresses the more
important it will be to ask the same questions about the union that we
have already asked about the employer. But our asking them raises a nice
problem in political administration, a problem of balancing against each
other the interests of two groups - state and union - with claims on
common members. It is a problem to which, so far, little consideration
has been given. Among the political philosophers, even such a pluralist
as Laski"° seems not to have paid much attention to it. For the lawyer
it is, of course, in some of its aspects, a considerably easier problem to
handle than is that of employer-employee relations. Passing from the
latter field to that of union-member relations, he not only avoids the diffi-
culties with which specific enforcement of personal relations or compu-
tation of damages for breach of an at-will relation is surrounded, for
example, but he jumps from a starting premise in the one case of free-
to-discharge-except-under-specified-conditions to that of not-free-to-disci-
pline-except-under-specified-conditions in the other."' (It should be added,
of course, that this last remark is not applicable to a case in which the
or through criminal sanctions against the employer, see ATT'v GEN'S CoMM. ON ADMtIN-
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, THE WALSH-HEALEY Acr (mimeographed ed. 1940) 16-17.
9. See, for examples, Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036 (1911);
Ryan v. Hayes, 243 Mass. 168, 137 N. E. 344 (1922); Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. &
Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938) ; O'Keefe v. Local 463, 277 N. Y.
300, 14 N. E. (2d) 77 (1938); Evans v. National Union of Printing Workers [1938]
4 All E. R. 51 (K. B.). Compare Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W.
1042 (1923) ; Sullivan v. Barrows, 21 N. E. (2d) 275 (Mass. 1939) ; Cameron v. Inter-
national Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 At. 692 (1935).
10. His A GR-mIMAR OF POLITICS (1925), though not adequately specific, is, how-
ever, suggestive in many places. See also MILNE-BAILEY, TRADE UNIONS AND THE STATE
(1934); 1 TELLER, THE LAW GOVERNING LAROR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1940) 225-234; BARATIER, L'AUTONOMIE SYNDICALE ET SES LiMITES DEVANT LES COURS
ANGLAISES (1928).
11. Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888); Polin v.
Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931); Luby v. Warwickshire Miners' Ass'n
[1912] 2 Ch. 371; Clarke v. Ferrie [1926] N. I. 1 (Ch.); cf. Clark v. Morgan, 271 Mass.
164, 171 N. E. 278 (1930) ("It is true the particular offense charged against the plain-
tiff is not specifically prohibited . . . [But the plaintiff] testified that he knew no mem-
ber should work on a job on which there was a strike and he admitted that, according to
the well known custom, it violated the constitution to work under such conditiong if
known . . .").
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union's action is that of refusing membership to an applicant.2 Here the
rule of delectus persoarum prevails.' Except in New York where denial
of membership on account of race, color or creed has been made a mis-
demeanor, 4 the furthest that English-speaking legislatures's or courts"C
have gone has been to put indirect pressure on the unions to keep their
doors open).
If we look at a few of the instances of possible conflict, the problem
in general may be somewhat clearer. No matter how pluralistically in-
clined we may be, it is not likely, for example, that we shall expect our
12. See WOLFE, ADMISSION To Ai.mtcAN TRADE UNIous (1912) on the subject in
general.
13. Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Ad. 492 (Ch.
1890), to the effect that there is no power in the courts to compel an unincorporated
association to admit to membership, is still good common law. See, in accord, Maguire
v. Buckley, 17 N. E. (2d) 170 (Mass. 1938); Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters,
89 N. J. L. 380, 99 Ad. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205
N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dep't 1924); Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
14. Laws of 1940, c. 9, p. 19. See Comment (1940) 53 HKAv. L. REV. 1215; Com-
ment (1939) 39 Cot. L. REv. 986, 995.
15. Australia bars the benefits of being a registered union to any organization which
"imposes unreasonable conditions . . . upon any applicant for membership" or does not
"provide reasonable facilities for the admission of new members . . .," Commonwealth
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904-1934, §§ 58D (1) (d), 60(1) (d); 1 COniol;-
wEALTEE AcTs, 1901-1935, 157, 159; see Marine Cooks, Bakers & Butchers Ass'n, Ex
parle Snell, 27 C. A. R. 43 (1928) ("such a high entrance fee as 610 can only be taken
as imposed for the purpose of unduly restricting membership"). In New Zealand a
union is limited to an entrance fee of five shillings if it wishes to be registered under the
Act [Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1925, § 143, as amended by Acts, 1936,
No. 6, §28; 3 PUBLIC AcTs, 1908-1931 (Reprint) 1005, Burr~awo=r's Ami. Purauc
AcTs (Supp. No. 11, 1939) 781; see Federated Seamen's Union v. Sanford [1930] N. Z.
L. R. 460, 464. Under Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act § 6(1) (c), PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 43 § 211.6(1) (c), any labor organization which excludes "by
ritualistic practice, constitutional or by-law proscription, by tacit agreement among its
members, or otherwise . . . a person or persons [from] membership . . . on account of
race, creed or color" or denies "membership to a person or persons who are employees of
the employer at the time of the making of such agreement" cannot have whatever benefit
the Act gives by way of validating a closed-shop contract. Similarly, under the Wiscon-
sin Labor Relations Act, WIs. STAT. (1939) §111.06(1)(c), the Board is directed
to "declare any . . . all-union agreement terminated whenever it finds that the labor
organization involved has unreasonably refused to receive as a member any employee
of the employer with whom it %s made. The Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Acts are
noted in (1940) 53 HAnv. L. REV. 500.
16. A result similar to that of the Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Acts, stpra note 15,
has been reached by judicial decision in New Jersey [Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail De-
liverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 AU. 720 (CI. 1938)] and adopted in 4 .EST,TE-
mENT, TORTS (1939) § 810. See Despres, The Collective Agrecnent for the Union Shop
(1939) 7 U. OF CHL L. REv. 24, 34; (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 754; cf. Warm, A Study of
the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade Unions and Labor Legislation (1939) 23 MInE.
L. REv. 255, 293.
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courts to allow a union member to be penalized for doing that which
the state commands him to do. Nor do the results in the courts disap-
point our expectations. The union member's obeying a subpoena and
testifying truly before a court or commission; 7 his playing with non-
union musicians contrary to the rule of the union when called on, as a
member of an army band, to do so ;"8 his refusing to follow the instruc-
tions of his fellow-unionists when he is acting as a member of a local
plumbing inspection board10 - none of these, the courts tell us, is justi-
fication for imposing discipline upon him.
What shall be the result if we move from the field of duty to that of
privilege? Shall it be said that the union, being a voluntary association,
is free to set for its members such standards of public conduct as it
sees fit? That it may, for example, if it so chooses, forbid its members
to break discipline by petitioning the legislature to repeal a statute sup-
ported by the officials of the organization? 2" That it may set up political
tests for its membership ?2 That it may punish those who institute liti-
gation against it or its friends?22 That it may dictate the way in which
its members shall vote for bargaining representatives in an election held
under one of our labor relations acts?"
The problem, obviously, is a broad and complicated one. Probably at
this stage of the game it would be unwise to venture more than a few
remarks that indicate the directions in which we shall have to look for
a solution. It seems quite proper, in the first place, to inquire into what
24is involved in expulsion from the union. For we must not forget that
17. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S. W. 144 (1908); Angrisani
v. Steam, 167 Misc. 731, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 701 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 975,
8 N. Y. S. (2d) 997 (2d Dep't 1938) ; cf. Abdon v. Wallace, 95 Ind. App. 604, 165 N. E.
68 (1929).
18. Parker v. Toronto Musical Prot. Ass'n, 32 Ont. 305 (C. P. 1900).
19. Schneider v. Local 60, 116 La. 270, 40 So. 700 (1905).
20. Compare Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Atl. 70 (1921).
21. Compare Shein v. Rose, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 87 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (refusal to admit
alleged Communist to full membership sustained) ; Judge v. Transport & General Work-
ers Union, summarized in [1937-1938] INT. SuRvEY OF LEGAL DEcisIONs oN LAORo LAW
17 from London Times, Dec. 11, 1937 (Ch.) (expulsion of Fascist enjoined for want of
union rule covering the matter). Compare Harmon v. United Mine Workers, 166 Ark.
255, 266 S. W. 84, 1119 (1924) (procuring discharge of union member expelled for join-
ing the Ku Klux Klan states no cause of action).
22. Compare Thompson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 41 Tex. Civ. App.
176, 91 S. W. 834 (1905) ; Burke v. Monumental Division, No. 52, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md.
1919), 286 Fed. 949 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 298 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924), rev'd and
bill dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction, 270 U. S. 629 (1926) ; cases cited note
34 infra,
23. Compare Ray v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P. (2d) 787
(1935).
24. I speak particularly of expulsion, for it and job-interference are the matters
most often litigated in the reported cases. But many of the remarks that are made about
(Vol. SO: 621626
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the union's functions vary. It may be merely a fighting and bargaining
organization. It may add to this the character of an insurance society.
It may, where closed-shop contracts prevail, become a job-dispensing
association with complete control over the work-market How much of
the pressure that arises from these interests the union shall be allowed
to bring to bear on the member in any particular instance is a question
of importance which can hardly be answered in an a priori manner. We
may in many cases be willing to see the recalcitrant member expelled from
the bargaining organization 25 where we should object to his being de-
prived of an accustomed livelihood. We may, in other instances, conclude
that even the pressure of expulsion alone ought not to be permitted. And
we may quite often believe that the union should be free to impose
whatever discipline it chooses.
We must inquire, in the second place, into the relevance, in determining
a case of the sort we are interested in, of the standards set by the Bill
of Rights for the state's own conduct. It would, of course, be going too
far to say that its spirit is so all-pervasive that no association may, by
rule or discipline, keep its members from the free exercise of any privilege
which is mentioned in it. We do not expect the same religious tolerance
of the United Presbyterian Church that we expect of the state. We do
not expect the same political tolerance of the Sixth Ward Republican
Club that we expect of the state. But, equally, it would be going too far
to say that the Bill of Rights is exclusively a state concern, that it has
no part to play in determining the legality or illegality of conduct on the
'part of individuals and associations. Whether we take the approach of
the courts in the expulsion cases and, arguing along contract lines, say
that an association's rules which are contrary to public policy are void25
or accept the rule of the Restatement which forbids the union to inter-
fere with the job possibilities of workers excluded from the union unless
their exclusion is on "reasonable" grounds,' we can hardly avoid giving
consideration to the standards set up by the Bill of Rights.
it will be equally applicable to other forms of discipline-fines and loss of office, for in-
stance-occasionally encountered in the cases and frequently employed by unions.
25. I do not mean by this, of course, that it is not of importance for a worker to have
bargaining representation. Compare National Fed. of Ry. Workers v. National Media-
tion Board, 110 F. (2d) 529, 537-538 (App. D. C. 1940), cert. dcnicd, 310 U. S. 628
(1940). But its importance must not be overrated since, as is the case, the non-union
worker is entitled to the fruits of whatever bargain is made. Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky.
834, 224 S. V. 459 (1920) ; Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. 1Z. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133
So. 669 (1931) ; see Yazoo & Miss. Valley . Mt. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902, 904 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933) ; cf. Rowlett v. Louisville & N. R. Mt., 255 Ky. 691, 75 S. NV. (2d) 371 (1934).
26. As, for example, in Schneider v. Local 60, supra note 19; Cameron v. Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, supra note 9.
27. 4 RE.STATMENT, ToRTs (1939) §810: "Workers who in concert procure the
dismissal of an employee because he is not a member of a labor union satisfactory to the
workers are . . . liable to the employee if, but only if, he desires to be a member of the
labor union but membership is not open to him on reasonable terms."
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In the third place we must ask about the relative importance of state
and union when their claims of freedom and of discipline are in conflict.
That both are important, we need not doubt. The issue is not one which
can be satisfactorily resolved by asserting that one is more sacred than
the other, that a claim on behalf of freedom by the state is entitled to
more respect than a claim of discipline on the part of the union or vice
versa. If we remind ourselves with Laski that the inevitability of the
state does not entitle it to "moral pre-eminence of any kind,""5 we must
also remind ourselves with John Dewey that "There is no more an
inherent sanctity in a church, trade-union, business corporation, or family
institution than there is in the state."2 The result is the necessity of
assessing the worth of the. jobs the organizations in question are doing
and the importance of freedom and discipline to the accomplishment of
those jobs. This is not an easy task. But the chances are strong, it would
seem, that as the democratic state becomes more and more "positive" -
that is, as it engages more and more energetically in the business of
supervising the economic system - it will more and more need all the
advice and criticism that it can get. It will need this advice and criticism
not only from organizations but from those organizations' members, for
its officials will need to know at first-hand how representative of their
members the official spokesmen for the organizations are. The implica-
tion of all this would seem to be that the state will be entitled to break
down whatever barriers stand in the way of the members' access to its
officials and legislators -that, in other words, to this extent at least,
it will be entitled to enforce the guarantees of free speech, free petition
and free assembly against organizations which might otherwise deny
them.
In the realm of political activity, however, the solution does not seem
to be quite so clear. Of course, if we could discover the proper functions
of the trade union in as simple a manner as did the House of Lords in
1909 when it ruled that the promotion of a political party was not among
them,"0 there would be little difficulty. If we could accept the orthodox
limits of trade union activity as the proper limits, we would not have
to discuss the matter much further. The claim for a union's rejecting
political tests has been put in strong language by a left-wing writer :01
28. LASKI, op. cit. supra note 10, at 88.
29. THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927) 74.
30. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants v. Osborne [1910] A. C. 87 (brilliantly
criticized in WEBB & WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (rev. ed. 1920) 608-631).
The effect of the judgment on political action was corrected by The Trade Union Act,
1913, 2 & 3 GEO. 5, c. 30. Compare The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17
& 18 GEO. 5, c. 22, § 4.
31. WOLFE, WHAT Is THE COMMUNIST OProsrION? (2d ed. 1933) 19. It is only
fair to say that the author of this pamphlet, written during the Trade Union Unity
League period of the Communist party, is here criticizing the party for taking its men-
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"What are the trade unions? The unions are the most elementary,
the broadest mass organizations of the working class . .. They
should include all workers regardless of creed, color, sex, age, occu-
pation, or political belief. The acid-test of the soundness of a union
organization is its functioning in a strike struggle. When a strike
begins, we do not ask a worker: 'Are you Catholic, Jew or Protest-
ant? Are you a Republican, Democrat or Socialist? Are you Fascist
or Ku Klux Kanner? If so you can't go out on strike with us.'
"On the contrary, we say to Fascist or Ku Kluxer or Tammany
voter: 'You work in the same shop. You have the same interests.
You suffer the same conditions, wage-cuts, long hours. You have
the same enemy, the same boss. Therefore you must come out
with us!'
"Obviously, then, a union is not a political party. It must not
exclude, but include. . . It must seek to include all who toil, all
who recognize the elementary fact that in questions of hours, wages
and working conditions, there is a conflict of interest between bosses
and workers."
Our problem, of course, is whether the courts, speaking for the state,
should require the unions to do what the trade unionist may urge them
to do. Shall the courts say that, however indistinct it may be, a line of
demarcation between political activity and proper trade union activity
must be found? It is doubtful whether the union can content itself for
long with no broader questions than those of wages, hours and working
conditions in the single shop or even the single industry. Shall the courts
say that it must? The ramifications even of these orthodox demands are
wide. The coal miners, for instance, apparently find it quite necessary
to intervene in public service commission hearings so that the claims of
coal to protection from the competition of g, electricity and oil shall
be heard from their point of view. 12 This reaches far into the economic
polity of the state. Shall the courts deny that it is a proper function of
the United Mine Workers? So, too, we may suppose that the railway
unions have a larger interest in the governance of their employers than
would be connoted by the orthodox definition of a union. Shall the courts
deny that this is so? The advancement of economic democracy, if I may
put it this way, may call for action on the political front. Trade union
discipline may call, at least sometimes, for adherence to a political pro-
gram. A departure from this program at the polls may be as serious an
offense as is crossing a picket line. Shall the courts forbid punishment
of the offender?
bers out of the main current of the American labor movement by organizing separate
unions for them.
32. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 112 Pa.
Super. 500, 171 At. 412 (1934); Illinois Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Peoples Gas Light
& Coke Co., 7 P. U. R. (N.s.) 403 (III. Commerce Comm. 1934).
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Perhaps the questions are not yet ripe for asking. But if they are, and
when they are, it is not likely that much help will be found in what little
public discussion of the matter we have had thus far. The circumstances
have not been favorable for clear thinking. We have been concerned
thus far largely with the attitude of unions towards supposed or real
Communists. At a time when the unions themselves are hardly less con-
servative than the rest of society on this issue,"3 it is too much to expect
any effective intervention by the legislatures or the courts on behalf of
the minority group. Such lack of expectation, of course, is no guide
to what may be looked for when the issue moves from the permissibility
of the unions' excluding the adherents of a group as distasteful to them
as they are to those who administer the law to the permissibility of their
laying down a political program to which all members, present and pros-
pective, are required to adhere. That requires, to repeat, a far more in-
telligent and sustained discussion than we have yet had.
But if we have some doubts one way or the other about the answers
to the questions that have so far been suggested, we ought, probably,
to have very few on some others. Freedom of litigation, for instance,
is hardly so essential a part of the democratic process that the courts
should be asked to strike down all hindrances to its pursuit. The courts
are as wise, to take an example of this, in adhering to the general require-
ment that all available remedies within the union be exhausted before
redress is sought before them 4 as they are unwise in many of the ex-
ceptions they have grafted upon this rule."0 Similarly, the importance
33. For accounts of trade union-Communist relations in the 1920's, see BIMBA, His-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (2d ed. 1933) 308-312, 338-349; PERLMAN
AND TAFT, LABOR MOVEMENTS (Vol. 4 of HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITE_ STATES)
(1935) 538-561; SCHNEIDER, THE WORKERS' (COMMUNIST) PARTY AND AMERICAN TRADE
UNIONs (1928).
34. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S. W. (2d) 69 (1935) (se-
niority); Agrippino v. Perrotti, 270 Mass. 55, 169 N. E. 793 (1930) (local autonomy as
to dues); Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931) (expulsion); Webb v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 136 S. W. (2d) 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (seniority).
35. Exceptions to the rule are chiefly allowed under these circumstances: (1) When
the union tribunal had no jurisdiction over the contest. Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N. M. 534,
174 Pac. 992 (1918) ; Gersh v. Ross, 238 App. Div. 552, 265 N. Y. Supp. 459 (1st Dep't
1933). Contra: Harris v. Detroit Typographical Union, 144 Mich. 422, 108 N. W. 362
(1906); Hickey v. Baine, 195 Mass. 446, 81 N. E. 201 (1907); Clark v. Morgan, 271
Mass. 164, 171 N. E. 278 (1930). (2) When there were serious procedural irregularities
before the tribunal. Johnson v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac.
170 (1930); Lo Bianco v. Cushing, 117 N. J. Eq. 593, 177 Atl. 102 (Ch. 1935), aff'd,
119 N. J. Eq. 377, 182 Atl. 874 (1936) ; Rodier v. Huddell, 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1931). Contra: Bonham v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen,
146 Ark. 117, 225 S. W. 335 (1920) ; Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Benson, 76 Tex.
552, 13 S. W. 379 (1890). (3) When the action is for damages rather than reinstate-
ment. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569 (1923) ;
St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 99, 113 S. W. 144 (1908). (4) When the
union's substantive rule in question is contrary to public policy. Cameron v. International
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of freedom from coercion by the employer in the choice of a bargaining
representative at a labor board election can only with difficulty be thought
of as implying a duty on the union's part not to discipline its members
if they choose to put another organization ahead of their own. The very
existence of the union will often depend on its being able to do so, and
on its existence depend most of the items - insurance benefits, an interest
in the union's assets, and the like - on which equitable relief, at least,
usually hinges. More important, far more important, is it that the member
who is thus required to stand by his union at such an election shall, along
with his fellows, have a voice, directly or indirectly, in the making of
whatever bargain is to be made.
This means, if the proposition is broadened a bit, that not only here
but in a great many other questions which arise as to the relation between
the state, the union, and the member, the responsiveness of the union to
the member must be looked into before we decide on state intervention
on his behalf or the contrary. (I put the matter in terms of "responsive-
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 20, 176 Adt. 692, 697 (1935) ;
Ray v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 182 Wash. 39, 44 P. (2d) 787 (1935). (5) When
the remedy within the organization is remote or indefinite. Harris v. Geier, 112 N. J.
Eq. 99, 164 AtI. 50 (Ch. 1932) ; Local 104 v. International Brotherhood of Boiler Mak-
ers, 158 Wash. 480, 291 Pac. 328 (1930) ; cf. Fish v. Huddell, 51 F. (2d) 319 (App. D.
C. 1931); Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931).
If the reason for the general requirement that remedies within the organization be
exhausted before coming to court is to minimize outside interference with the normal
workings of the organization and to give it an opportunity for self-correction of errors,
if it is to mitigate damages and to avoid litigation expenses wherever possible, if it is
to allow the union, by developing its own interpretation of its rules, to achieve a uniform-
ity in application that cannot be achieved through the courts [cf. Moore v. Illinois Cen-
tral R. R., 112 F. (2d) 959 (1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 392 (1940); Norfolk
& W. Ry. v. Harris, 260 Ky. 132, 84 S. V. (2d) 69 (1935)], then many of the exceptions
just noted ought not to prevail. The rule should be that all errors for which a corrective
device is provided by the union and which are not highly unlikely to be corrected through
this device must go through these channels. This is not to say that there is no room
afterwards for an award of damages if, as is often the case [Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 499,98 So. 569, 572 (1923), app. dimisscd, 265 U. S. 576
(1924) ; Blanchard v. Newark Joint District Council, 77 N. J. L. 3S9, 71 Ad. 1131 (Sup.
Ct. 1909), aff'd, 78 N. 3. L. 737, 76 At. 1087 (1910). But ci. Stivers v. Blethen, 124
Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923); Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 734, 159 N. Y. Supp.
1053, 1056 (Sup. Ct. 1916)], reversal by an appellate union tribunal leaves the plaintiff
without satisfaction for loss incurred in the meantime. Nor is it to say that there is no
room at all for court action in the meantime. But this action should be confined, as it was
in Powell v. United Ass'n of Plumbers, 240 N. Y. 616, 148 N. E. 728 (1925), to the fur-
nishing of a supersedeas device until internal remedies are exhausted. Even the argument
of futility, sound as it is, [Barbrick v. Huddell, 245 Mass. 428, 139 N. E. 629 (1923);
Heasley v. Operative Plasterers Int. Ass'n, 324 Pa. 257, 188 Ati. 205 (1936) ; cf. Mulcahy
v. Huddell, 272 Mass. 539, 172 N. E. 796 (1930)] could probably be better handled in this
way than otherwise in view of the ease with which futility can be alleged and made to
seem probable.
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ness" rather than of "the civil liberties of the members inside of the organ-
ization" because the latter might seem too bold an offer to intervention
by strangers.) This, I suggest, is a fourth factor that must go into the
making of any judgment as to the proper solution of the more general
question -the question, that is, of how far the union can go in restrict-
ing the privileges of its members in the community at large -that has
already been suggested.
The greater the power the union has - the greater, that is, the number
of restrictions it can legitimately place on its members outside of its
walls -the more important it is that the essentials of democratic pro-
cedure within its walls be observed. Conversely, the less these essentials
are observed the more reason there is to limit the area of the organiza-
tion's power over its membership.
It will not do, of course, for the state to examine the workings of
unions on their legislative and their treaty-making sides with the meticu-
lousness with which it supervises their judicial processes. But the two
are of much the same order. Few are the issues of procedural due process,
for instance, that have not been raised where a union's judgment has
been attacked in court. Notice and hearing,"0 specificity of charges, 7 the
36. Some courts, treating these requirements as a normal rule, impose them in the
absence of provisions to the contrary in the organization's constitution or by-laws or use
them as a standard when construing inexplicit provisions of the organization's rules.
Gardner v. Newbert, 74 Ind. App. 183, 128 N. E. 704 (1920) ; Steinert v. United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters, 91 Minn. 189, 97 N. W. 668 (1903); Cotton Jammers & Long-
shoremen's Ass'n v. Taylor, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 56 S. W. 553 (1900); Riverside
Lodge No. 164 v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron Workers, 13 F. Supp. 873 (W. D. Pa.
1935); Burn v. National Amal. Labourers' Union [1920] 2 Ch. 364. Others hold that
discipline without notice and hearing is so contrary to public policy that even a specific
rule to the contrary will not be tolerated. Swaine v. Miller, 72 Mo. App. 446 (1897);
Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Bricklayers'
Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd, 198 App. Div. 967, 189
N. Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dep't 1921) ; see Blek v. Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 266 N. Y. Supp.
91 (Sup. Ct. 1933), rev'd, 242 App. Div. 815, 275 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st Dep't 1934). But
see People ex rel. Schults v. Love, 199 App. Div. 815, 817, 192 N. Y. Supp. 354 (1st
Dep't 1922) ("This being a voluntary unincorporated association, it was entirely com-
petent for the union to provide, as was here provided, for a suspension or expulsion of a
member by summary action and without formal trial . . ."). Contra: Brown v. Leh-
man, 15 A. (2d) 513 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940). In the second case, the rule of the Pennsyl-
vania court makes more sense than that of the lower New York courts, but adoption of
it, of course, leaves the court free to inquire into the merits of the disciplinary action takei
where it would not otherwise be free to do so. The same remark is applicable to other
matters essential to the fair trial of an issue of fact or to the fair determination of the
meaning of a union rule. In other words, apart from the question whether or not the
union has followed the procedure which it has prescribed for itself, the questions before
the court should be (1) whether that procedure is such as is likely to yield a just result
and (2) in the absence, but only in the absence, of such a procedure, what the truth of
the fact or the proper construction of the rule in dispute is.
37. Johnson v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, 52 Nev. 400, 288 Pac. 170 (1930).
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substantialness of the evidence,3 confrontation of witnesses,"0 double
jeopardy,4" bias on the tribunal's part 4' - all of these and many more
have been the subjects of examination. This civil liberty at least is well
supervised from the outside. Such supervision, of course, is not an essen-
tial part of state-union relations. The courts, ignoring the internal pro-
cedures of the union completely, could determine de noro the issue before
the union tribunal - whether the member committed the act with wlich
he was charged, for instance -and allow or disallow ouster accordingly.
They could, if they so chose, both do this and require that procedural
safeguards be observed inside of the union. But what they could hardly
do decently is to give finality to the union's judgments and at the same
time refuse to pass upon the adequacy of the trial before the union tribu-
nal. Whether the case before the union lies on its criminal side - e.g., tle
disciplining of a member for disobedience to the union's law 42 - or on
its civil side - e.g., a dispute as to the proper interpretation of a seniority
clause in a collective bargain43 - it is this goal of finality that many of
38. Kouldy v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; Weiss
v. Musical Mut. Prot. Union, 189 Pa. 446, 42 At. 118 (1899).
39. See Koukly v. Weber, 154 Misc. 659, 661-2, 277 N. Y. Supp. 39, 42 (Sup. Ct.
1935). Compare, as to the privilege of the proposed disciplinee to be present throughout
the proceedings, Fales v. Musicians' Prot. Union, 40 R. I. 34, 99 AUt. 823 (1917) ; Ross
v. Electrical Trades Union, 81 Sol. J. 650 (Ch. 1937).
40. With Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N. 3f. 534, 174 Pac. 992 (1918), compare Simpson v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 83 IV. Va. 355, 376, 98 S. E. 580, 593 (1919),
cert. denied, 250 U. S. 644 (1919) ; Burke v. Monumental Division No. 52, 286 Fed. 949
(D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 298 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924), disnisscd for want of federal
jurisdiction, 270 U. S. 629 (1926).
41. With Gaestel v. Brotherhood of Painters, 120 N. J. Eq. 358, 185 At. 36 (Cli.
1936); Koukly v. Canavan, 154 Misc. 343, 277 N. Y. Supp. 28 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Weiss
v. Musical Mut. Prot. Union, 189 Pa. 446, 42 Atl. 118 (1899); Local 7, Bricklayers'
Union v. Bowen, 278 Fed. 271, 278 (S. D. Tex. 1922), compare Maclean v. Workers'
Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 (includes strong criticism of the "natural justice" doctrine);
Hall v. Morrin, 293 S. W. 435 (Mo. App. 1927).
42. McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal. App. 696, 289 Pac. 852
(1930) ; Elfer v. Marine Engineers Benef. Ass'n, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934) ; Shinsky
v. Tracey, 226 Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (1917); Simpson v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers, 83 IV. Va. 355, 98 S. E. 580 (1919), cert. denied, 250 U. S. 644 (1919). See
Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 163, 176 N. E. 791, 792 (1931). How far these and simi-
lar cases will carry when the question is one of the construction of the union's substantive
rules covering offenses is not at all clear in view of the rule-see the cases cited supra
note 11-that the union may punish only for offenses specified in its constitution and by-
laws. Compare, in Burke v. Monumental Division No. 52, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md. 1919),
the scope of judicial review accorded to the claim of wrong venue within the union with
that given the claim of no cause of action under union law.
43. Shaup v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327
(1931); Evans v. Johnston, 300 Ill. App. 78, 20 N. E. (2d) 841 (1939), cert. denied,
309 U. S. 662 (1940); Ryan v. New York C. R. R., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N. V. 365
(1934) ; Franklin v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 Ad.
712 (Ch. 1937); Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Price, 103 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex.
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our courts avowedly pursue.44 It is the acceptance of this goal that dic-
tates the road which precedes it.
But just as finality can decently be given the union's judgment only
if safeguards have been erected along the way, so the liberality of the
state towards the union's legislation ought to depend in large measure
on the availability of modes of redress within the union. The individual
member can better be asked to forego appeal to the state for help if it is
certain that his voice will be heard within the organization than other-
wise. The difficulty is, of course, that we have no such set norms for
*democratic procedure as we have for judicial. Within the state itself
we are constantly experimenting. The town meeting and representative
assemblies, the long ballot and the increase in appointed officers, the
initiative and referendum and the limitation of the number of times a
constitutional amendment can be proposed within a given period- all
of these are competitors with each other for making a workable system.
So in the union: the extent to which popular control of the executive
shall go, whether the collective bargain shall be negotiated by a small
committee behind closed doors or in full sight of the membership as the
American Newspaper Guild advocates in its "goldfish bowl" policy, how
much local autonomy there shall be and how much central control, whether
the initiative and referendum are usable or not - all of these are open
questions. They must be so as long as unions are confronted with prob-
lems diverse as they face today. And as those problems change, as the
union's functions vary, the answers to these questions will vary, too. It
would be presumptuous, under these circumstances, for the state to say
with much particularity where, to use the Webbs' phrase, "the long and
inarticulate struggle of unlettered men to solve the problem of how to
Civ. App. 1937). The qualifications employed by the courts in these cases to indicate
where the rule of finality stops vary: "construction of the rules . . .upon a matter as
to which an honest difference of opinion may well appear to exist"; "mere difference of
opinion between two contending bodies of men"; not "arbitrary or unjust, or an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the Order's statutes, constitution or custom"; "no evidence of
fraud, oppression or bad faith" are some of the phrases they use. With the cases just
cited, compare Shadley v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 212 Mo. App. 653, 254 S. W.
363 (1923); Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. 1916);
Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W. Va. 550, 186 S. E. 304 (1936).
44. For discussions of finality on other subjects, consult Brotherhood of R. R. Train-
men v. Barnhill, 214 Ala. 565, 108 So. 456 (1926) (discontinuance of strike benefits);
Durkin v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 170 Md. 562, 185 Atl. 322 (1936) (in-
surance) ; Maloney v. District 1, United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225 (1932)
(election nomination procedure) ; International Hod Carriers, Local 426 v. International
Hod Carriers, Local 502, 101 N. J. Eq. 474, 138 Atl. 532 (Ch. 1927) (chartering of
locals) ; Pratt v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Ry. Employees, 50 Utah 472, 167 Pac.
830 (1917) (rules governing issuance of withdrawal and transfer cards); Stivers v.
Blethen, 124 Wash. 473, 215 Pac. 7 (1923); Harris v. Missouri P. R. R., 1 F. Supp. 946
(E. D. Ill. 1931) (appellate procedure); cf. McNichols v. International Typographical
Union, 21 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) (constitutional amendment procedure).
[Vol. 50: 621
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 634 1940-1941
1941] CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE TRADE UNION 635
combine administrative efficiency with popular control"45 shall end. It is
not so presumptuous for its courts to say that this is a matter which they
-will take into consideration in deciding how broad the allowable area of
union control over its members' activities is. To do this job well requires
far more knowledge than we now have of how, in fact, the unions oper-
ate internally. To accumulate this knowledge will require a generation
of careful observation and research. To interpret it will require the
niceness of a Mansfield's, a Cardozo's, judgment. Both have still to
be sought for. In the meantime, all judgments must be tentative and the
preaching of democracy in the voluntary association that we call the
trade union as well as in that compulsory society which we call the state
has got to go on.
45. INmusTRmx DmocRAcy (1920 ed.) 58. Lerner, Democracy Lith a Union Card
(1938) in InsEs ARE WEFAPONS (1939) 517, 528, also puts the matter neatly: "The pres-
ent movement to impose labor discipline from without is based on a tragically false pre-
mise. Thepremise is that you can produce either responsibility or democracy by fiat.
Trade unions can be successfully regulated only when they have already achieved their
basic objectives."
HeinOnline  -- 50 Yale L. J. 635 1940-1941
